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PRECEDENTIAL 
   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1362 
_____________ 
 
HAROLD M. HOFFMAN,  
individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, 
 Appellant 
  
v. 
 
NORDIC NATURALS, INC. 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-14-cv-03291) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 9, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 14, 2016) 
                                              
 Honorable Julio M. Fuentes assumed senior status on July 
18, 2016. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Harold M. Hoffman is a serial pro se class action 
litigant from New Jersey who frequently sues under the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.  In a previous opinion, we noted 
that Hoffman is “an attorney who has made a habit of filing 
class actions in which he serves as both the sole class 
representative and sole class counsel.”1  According to the 
                                              
1 Hoffman v. Nutraceutical Corp., 563 F. App’x 183, 184 (3d 
Cir. 2014); see, e.g., Hoffman v. Liquid Health Inc., No. 14-
1838, 2014 WL 2999280 (D.N.J. July 2, 2014); Hoffman v. 
DSE Healthcare Sols., LLC, No. 13-7582, 2014 WL 1155472 
(D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2014); Hoffman v. Lumina Health Prods., 
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record in this case, Hoffman has sued nearly 100 defendants 
in New Jersey state court in a period of less than four years.2  
These defendants include Target, Whole Foods Market, GNC, 
Trader Joes, Barleans Organic Oils LLC, Paradise Herbs & 
Essentials Inc., Honest Tea Inc., Time Warner Cable, 
American Express, Bio Nutrition Inc., and many more.3 
 
 In this case, Hoffman chose to sue Nordic Naturals, 
Inc. for its allegedly false and misleading advertisements for 
fish oil supplements.  Prior to bringing the present action, 
Hoffman filed a similar lawsuit against Nordic, asserting 
virtually identical claims based on the same set of facts.  The 
District Court dismissed that first lawsuit for failure to state a 
claim.  The District Court accordingly dismissed this second 
lawsuit as procedurally barred by the first.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
 
 
I. 
 In August 2012, Harold Hoffman filed a putative class 
action lawsuit pro se against Nordic Naturals in New Jersey 
state court for violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud 
Act (“Hoffman I”).4  He alleged that Nordic misrepresented 
                                                                                                     
Inc., No. 13-4936, 2013 WL 5773292 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2013); 
Hoffman v. Nat. Factors Nutritional Prods., No. 12-7244, 
2013 WL 5467106 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2013). 
2 Hoffman v. Nordic Naturals, Inc., No. 2-14-cv-3291, ECF 
No. 12, Ex. 2. 
3 See id. 
4 In Hoffman I, Hoffman alleged five claims under the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 et seq.: 
(i) unconscionable commercial practice; (ii) deception; 
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the “safety, quality, testing, constituent ingredients and 
purity” of its product “Ultimate Omega,” a fatty acid fish oil 
supplement.5  Specifically, Hoffman claimed that, contrary to 
Nordic’s product labeling and marketing representations, 
Ultimate Omega is “tainted by an undisclosed overdose of a 
potentially harmful ingredient.”6  Thus, according to 
Hoffman, Nordic’s representations that it is committed to 
delivering the “world’s safest” omega oils and has achieved 
“award-winning” purity levels are false.7  The putative class 
consisted of all nationwide purchasers of Ultimate Omega 
within a six-year period.8   
 
 Nordic removed Hoffman I to federal court pursuant to 
the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).9  CAFA gives 
federal district courts original jurisdiction over class actions 
in which (i) the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 
million, (ii) there are at least 100 members in the putative 
class, and (iii) there is minimal diversity between the 
parties.10  Hoffman filed a motion in the District Court to 
remand the case back to state court, which the District Court 
                                                                                                     
(iii) fraud; (iv) false pretense, false promise and/or 
misrepresentation; and (v) knowing concealment, suppression 
and/or omission of material facts.  Suppl. App. 31-33.  He 
also asserted claims for common law fraud, unjust 
enrichment, breach of express warranty, and breach of 
implied warranty of merchantability.  Id. at 34-39. 
5 Id. at 26, ¶ 19. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 22, ¶ 3. 
8 [Id. at 28, ¶ 27.] 
9 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1453; id. § 1332(d). 
10 Id. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(b). 
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denied.11  Nordic moved for judgment on the pleadings under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).12  The District Court 
dismissed Hoffman I without prejudice and gave Hoffman 
leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days.13 
 
 But rather than file an amended complaint in the 
District Court, Hoffman filed a new class action lawsuit 
against Nordic in New Jersey state court within the 30-day 
window given to amend Hoffman I.  This second lawsuit 
(“Hoffman II”) arose from facts identical to those in Hoffman 
I—Hoffman’s purchase of Ultimate Omega in May 2012—
and it asserted virtually identical claims under the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act.14  But there was one significant 
difference: the putative class size was substantially smaller.  
Rather than a class consisting of all nationwide purchasers of 
all available sizes of Ultimate Omega within a six-year 
period, the putative class in Hoffman II was restricted to New 
Jersey consumers who purchased only a 60-count bottle of 
Ultimate Omega (as opposed to a 120-count or 180-count 
bottle) within a one-year period.15  The purpose of this change 
was, it seems, to reduce the amount recoverable and therefore 
defeat federal jurisdiction. 
 
 Undeterred by Hoffman’s tactics, Nordic removed 
Hoffman II back to the District Court.  Nordic then moved to 
                                              
11 [Suppl. App. 51-60.] 
12 [See id. at 61.] 
13 [Id.] 
14 In Hoffman II, Hoffman alleged the same five claims under 
the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.  App. 37-40.  He did 
not raise any common law claims. 
15 [App. 26.] 
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dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), claiming that Hoffman II was barred by New 
Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine, which is New Jersey’s 
“application of traditional res judicata principles.”16  In the 
alternative, Nordic argued that the complaint failed to state a 
claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.17  Hoffman 
moved for limited discovery to determine whether subject 
matter jurisdiction existed under CAFA.18  He argued that, 
given the significantly reduced class size in Hoffman II, 
limited discovery would help the court ascertain whether the 
amount in controversy exceeded the $5 million jurisdictional 
minimum.19   
 
 The District Court granted Nordic’s motion and 
dismissed Hoffman II with prejudice.20  It held that the action 
was procedurally barred under New Jersey’s entire 
controversy doctrine and, in the alternative, that Hoffman’s 
claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act failed for 
substantially the same reasons they failed in Hoffman I.21  The 
District Court then dismissed as moot Hoffman’s motion for 
limited discovery, explaining that Hoffman’s artificial 
narrowing of the putative class was a “poorly disguised 
                                              
16 Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 
886 (3d Cir. 1997). 
17 [See App. 5.] 
18 [App. 74-78.] 
19 [Id.] 
20 [App. 14.] 
21 [App. 1-13.] 
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attempt” to destroy CAFA jurisdiction.22  Hoffman appealed 
to this Court.23 
 
II. 
 
 Hoffman challenges (1) the District Court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction under CAFA; (2) the District Court’s 
application of New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine; and 
(3) the District Court’s alternative conclusion that the 
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.  We review these issues de novo.24 
 
  
                                              
22 Hoffman v. Nordic Naturals, Inc., No. 14-3291, 2015 WL 
179539, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2015). 
23 Nordic claims that Hoffman’s appeal was untimely.  We 
disagree.  Hoffman’s notice of appeal was filed within 30 
days of the District Court’s order dismissing Hoffman II.  See 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  Accordingly, we will deny 
Nordic’s motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
24 See Ricketti v. Barry, 775 F.3d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 2015); 
Judon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 773 F.3d 495, 500 
(3d Cir. 2014); Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved 
Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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A.  Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
 Hoffman devotes much of his appeal to challenging 
the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. According to 
him, the District Court was required to make jurisdictional 
findings of fact to ensure that the amount in controversy met 
the jurisdictional minimum under CAFA.  Hoffman is 
incorrect. 
 
 It is true that a federal court may not rule on the merits 
of an action without first ascertaining whether it has subject 
matter jurisdiction to do so.25  But in Sinochem International 
Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp.,26 the Supreme 
Court held that a court is not required to establish jurisdiction 
before dismissing a case on non-merits grounds, since such a 
dismissal “means that the court will not proceed at all to an 
adjudication of the cause.”27  In other words, “jurisdiction is 
vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the 
merits.”28  In Sinochem itself, the district court dismissed the 
case on the ground of forum non conveniens, which the 
Supreme Court explained is merely “a determination that the 
merits should be adjudicated elsewhere.”29 
 
 In this case, the District Court dismissed Hoffman II on 
claim preclusion grounds, which is not technically a judgment 
                                              
25 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 
(1998). 
26 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
27 Id. at 431 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
29 Id. at 432. 
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on the merits.30  Rather, claim preclusion is merely “a 
determination that the merits [have already been] adjudicated 
elsewhere.”31  Indeed, for reasons of fairness, finality, and 
judicial economy, claim preclusion prohibits a court from 
reaching the merits of a claim.  The District Court was 
therefore permitted to “bypass” the jurisdictional inquiry in 
favor of a non-merits dismissal on claim preclusion 
grounds.32  Accordingly, we reject Hoffman’s subject matter 
jurisdiction challenge on appeal.33   
 
 B.  Claim Preclusion 
 
 The District Court operated under the assumption that 
New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine—“a state rule of 
procedure that discourages successive litigation concerning 
                                              
30 See Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 
597 (1948) (“If the doctrine of res judicata is properly 
applicable . . . the case may be disposed of without reaching 
the merits of the controversy.”). 
31 Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 432. 
32 See Davis Int’l, LLC v. New Start Grp. Corp., 488 F.3d 
597, 604 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that, per Sinochem, the 
district court was not required to first establish jurisdiction 
before dismissing the case on estoppel grounds).  
33 The District Court reached the merits of Hoffman’s claims 
in the alternative, and, per Sinochem, was required to 
establish subject matter jurisdiction before doing so.  But the 
District Court properly held that Hoffman II should be 
dismissed on claim preclusion grounds, and Sinochem tells us 
that we can affirm on that non-merits dismissal without 
addressing the merits-based dismissal at all. 
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the same subject matter”34—applies in this case.  However, in 
Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta,35 we held that the entire 
controversy doctrine “is not the right preclusion doctrine for a 
federal court to apply when prior judgments were not entered 
by the courts of New Jersey.”36  Upon conducting an 
extensive Erie analysis, we concluded that federal, not New 
Jersey, claim preclusion principles apply in successive federal 
diversity actions.37  That is, when the first judgment is 
rendered by a federal district court in New Jersey sitting in 
diversity, as it was here, federal claim preclusion, not New 
Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine, determines whether a 
successive lawsuit is permissible.38  Indeed, courts in our 
Circuit have routinely applied Paramount Aviation to reject 
applying New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine when the 
first judgment was not rendered by a New Jersey state court.39 
                                              
34 Ricketti, 775 F.3d at 612. 
35 178 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 1999). 
36 Id. at 138. 
37 Id. at 144-45; see also Gannon v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., 
48 A.3d 1094, 1104 (N.J. 2012) (concluding that because the 
first judgment was rendered by a federal court, it “look[s] to 
federal law to determine that judgment’s preclusive effect” 
(citing Paramount, 178 F.3d at 145)). 
38 See Paramount, 178 F.3d at 142 (“New Jersey’s main 
justification for the doctrine, its interest in preserving its 
judicial resources, is minimized when none of the prior 
litigation took place in New Jersey state courts.”). 
39 See, e.g., Bach v. McGinty, No. 12-5853, 2015 WL 
1383945, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2015) (“The entire 
controversy doctrine will preclude claims brought in federal 
court only if the preclusive judgment came from a New 
Jersey court . . . .”); Yantai N. Andre Juice Co. v. Kupperman, 
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 The Supreme Court’s decision in Semtek International 
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.40 creates an interesting 
doctrinal question vis-à-vis Paramount Aviation.41  In Semtek, 
the Supreme Court held that we apply the claim preclusion 
law “that would be applied by state courts in the State in 
which [a] federal diversity court sits,” unless “the state law is 
incompatible with federal interests.”42  This seems to suggest 
that we should apply New Jersey’s entire controversy 
doctrine to judgments rendered by federal diversity courts in 
New Jersey.  Yet Paramount Aviation tells us that the entire 
controversy doctrine is procedural rather than substantive and 
that, therefore, consistent with Erie, we should apply federal 
claim preclusion principles to federal diversity judgments.  
We need not resolve this conflict, however, because under 
either New Jersey or federal claim preclusion principles we 
come to the same result.43    
 
                                                                                                     
No. 05-CV-1049, 2005 WL 2338854, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 
2005) (“In this case, the issuing court in 2002 was the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey. 
Therefore, the New Jersey Entire Controversy Doctrine is 
inapplicable.”). 
40 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
41 We recently discussed this issue in Chavez v. Dole Food 
Co., --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL X, at *Y n.130 (3d Cir. Sept. Z, 
2016) (en banc) [placeholder]. 
42 Id. at 508-09. 
43 This approach is consistent with the approach taken by 
another panel of this Court when addressing a similar issue.  
See McHale v. Kelly, 527 F. App’x 149, 151-52 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
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 “Both New Jersey and federal law apply res judicata or 
claim preclusion when three circumstances are present: (1) a 
final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the 
same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based 
on the same cause of action.”44  The third factor “generally is 
thought to turn on the essential similarity of the underlying 
events giving rise to the various legal claims.”45   
 
 All three elements are present here.46  There is no 
question that the parties in Hoffman I and Hoffman II are 
identical.  Likewise, the underlying event giving rise to 
Hoffman’s claims is the same in both cases: Hoffman’s 
exposure to Nordic’s advertising for Ultimate Omega and 
consequent decision to purchase Ultimate Omega in New 
Jersey in May 2012.  Recognizing these similarities, Hoffman 
seems to argue only that the District Court’s dismissal 
                                              
44 In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
45 Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 277 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
46 We note that although Nordic technically raised an entire 
controversy defense in its motion to dismiss, because the 
substantive analysis for purposes of this case is functionally 
the same, we will construe Nordic’s motion as raising a res 
judicata defense.  See Rycoline Prods., 109 F.3d at 886 
(describing the entire controversy doctrine and res judicata as 
“blood relatives”); Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., 
889 F.2d 41, 43 n.5 (3d Cir. 1989) (describing the entire 
controversy doctrine and res judicata as “inextricably 
related”).  We may affirm on any ground supported by the 
record.  Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d 
Cir. 2014).   
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without prejudice of Hoffman I was not a “final” judgment.  
We disagree. 
 
 The District Court dismissed Hoffman I without 
prejudice for failure to state a claim – a decision on the merits 
– and provided Hoffman 30-days’ leave to amend.47  When 
that 30-day period expired, the District Court’s decision 
became final.  Indeed, we have held that a plaintiff can 
convert a dismissal without prejudice into a final order by 
“declar[ing] his intention to stand on his complaint.”48  By 
opting to not amend his complaint in Hoffman I within the 
time frame provided by the District Court, Hoffman elected to 
“stand on his complaint,” thereby converting the District 
Court’s dismissal into a final order.49  We reject Hoffman’s 
                                              
47 For these purposes, a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
under Rule 12(c) is identical to a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  See Turbe v. Gov’t of 
V.I., 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). 
48 Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 
1976). 
49 See, e.g., Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 31 
n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiff’s] failure to amend his 
complaint in the time frame allotted by the District Court 
reflects his intention to stand on his complaint, which renders 
the District Court’s order final . . . .”); Berke v. Bloch, 242 
F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that the plaintiffs’ 
failure to reinstate their action within the 60-day leave given 
to do so was “akin to standing on their complaint”); Batoff v. 
State Farm Ins., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[B]y 
failing to move to amend within the 30 days granted by the 
court, [plaintiff] elected to stand on his complaint.  Thus, 
14 
 
contention that his filing of Hoffman II evidenced his 
intention to not stand on his complaint in Hoffman I.  
Hoffman cannot plausibly make this argument, which implies 
that he intended to fix the flaws in Hoffman I, while at the 
same time adamantly maintaining that Hoffman II is an 
entirely different lawsuit based on entirely different claims.  
If Hoffman had intended to fix the problems in Hoffman I, he 
was required to file an amended complaint in the District 
Court.  Filing a new action in a different court does not 
prevent the District Court’s order from ripening into a final 
order.  Thus, we conclude that all three elements of claim 
preclusion are satisfied.  Hoffman II is therefore procedurally 
barred by Hoffman I. 
 
 We acknowledge that res judicata is an affirmative 
defense that typically may not afford the basis for a Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal unless it is “apparent on the face of the 
complaint.”50  If not apparent, the district court must either 
deny the 12(b)(6) motion or convert it to a motion for 
summary judgment and provide both parties an opportunity to 
present relevant material.51  The ultimate purpose of this rule 
is to avoid factual contests at the motion to dismiss stage.  
However, we find this rule to be inapplicable to the 
circumstances of this case.   
 
 There are no factual disputes here.  Moreover, both the 
District Court and the parties were not only aware of but 
                                                                                                     
even if the order of dismissal was not final when entered, it 
became final after 30 days.”). 
50 Rycoline Prods., 109 F.3d at 886 (quoting Bethel v. 
Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
51 Id. at 886-87. 
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intimately familiar with Hoffman’s previous lawsuit, since 
the same judge adjudicated Hoffman I and ruled on those 
claims.  The ordinary requirement that a potential res judicata 
defense appear “on the face” of Hoffman II is unnecessary 
when the District Court was already aware of Hoffman I and 
indeed entered a final judgment in that case.  And, of course, 
the two pleadings that are before us and were before the 
District Court – the complaint in Hoffman I and the complaint 
in Hoffman II – as well as the judgment in Hoffman I, are 
matters of public record.52  We therefore find no error in the 
District Court’s decision to look to these records and grant 
Nordic’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of Hoffman II.   
                                              
52 See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 n.1 (1986) 
(“Although this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), we are not 
precluded in our review of the complaint from taking notice 
of items in the public record . . . .”); Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (“To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally 
consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, 
exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public 
record.”); see also C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. 
Lobrano, 695 F.3d 758, 764 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Our 
interpretation of the phrase ‘face of the complaint’ includes 
public records and materials embraced by the complaint, and 
materials attached to the complaint.” (citations omitted)). 
